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Thailand’s Security Sector “Deform” and “Reform” 
 
Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat 
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite a 2019 election, Thailand remains dominated by the military and monarchy. The state 
implemented security sector reforms at the national level and the Deep South regional level, before 
and after a 2014 military coup, which overthrew the country’s frail democracy. Thailand offers an 
impressive example of pitfalls and contradictory practices in security sector reform (SSR) because 
the country’s military junta supported globally transferred notions of SSR but applied them 
distinctively at different regional levels. Nationally, the military utilized universalist SSR notions to 
rationalize its prolongation and even expansion of autocracy. But regarding the Deep South 
insurgency, the junta applied a more progressive version of SSR, continuing negotiations with 
insurgents while reducing military abuses in the Deep South region. This study analyzes Thailand’s 
simultaneous “deform and reform” dynamics in the field of security sector governance. The 
authors examine why national SSR has been such a deform of more sincere SSR efforts in 
Thailand’s South. 
INTRODUCTION 
2021 finds Thailand in a crisis of intensifying political pandemonium. But in a country which has 
experienced different levels of political turmoil over the last decade, it has not been uncommon. 
What is new this year is the almost daily demonstrations by large numbers of youth-led protestors 
who are boldly calling for military and monarchical reform, as well as their demand that the 
current Prime Minister resigns. The demonstrations are unprecedented and are happening 
throughout the country. A military coup, meant to repress the demonstrations, could be on the 
horizon. 
With the protests and possible coup in mind, this paper examines the implementation of security 
policies in Thailand at both the national (center) level and more specifically at the Deep South 
regional (periphery) level before and after the 2014 military coup, which overthrew the country’s 
democracy. Following that putsch, the armed forces directly administered the country through 
authoritarian rule. In 2018 Thailand represented the only case worldwide where a formal military 
regime wielded power. On March 24, 2019, the junta oversaw a general election monitored by 
junta-appointed election commissioners, enforced by soldiers, and in which a proxy military 
political party (Palang Pracharat) competed. Amidst allegations of electoral wrongdoing, Palang 
Pracharat was victorious at the polls, it formed a ruling coalition and the coalition chose 2014–
2019 junta leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha to lead the country as Prime Minister (Sawasdee 
2019). Since 2019, the government has remained dominated by the military.  
Thailand offers a particularly astonishing example of security sector reform (SSR). This is because 
the Thai junta and successor government have looked favorably upon globally transferred notions 
of SSR, but have applied the concepts distinctively at different regional levels. The military has 
utilized universalist notions of SSR to rationalize the prolongation and even expansion of 
autocracy across the country. The deformed translation of these normative concepts is thus 
ironically practical for Thai authoritarians, who are opposed to the original concepts (and goals) of 
SSR but still want to pay lip service to them. Nevertheless, with regard to a long-simmering Malay-
Muslim insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South, the putsch appears to have transitioned the military 
toward spearheading moves in favor of negotiations with insurgents while reducing military abuses 
in the Deep South. Much of what goes on in that part of Thailand actually achieves the ends of SSR 
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in the way the concept has been defined by the United Nations, the OECD and other global norm 
agents in that field (United Nations 2012: 3; OECD 2007: 22). We analyse the striking 
simultaneous “deform and reform” dynamics in the field of security sector governance in 
Thailand, and the extent to which they are influenced by external players.  
In this paper, we argue that since the 2014 coup, Thailand, despite the apparent resumption of 
electoral democracy in 2019, has represented a case of near-total military victory over elected 
civilians in the tug-of-war between the two over control of decision-making policy power. 
Moreover, almost all international SSR efforts have been turned on their head across the country. 
Thai political progress at the national level has been “deformed” by the post-2014 persistence of 
the military’s political domination as well as the large number of military coups and juntas 
throughout Thai history and support for military rule from the monarchy, which have impeded 
attempts to achieve lasting and decisive SSR. Meanwhile, at the level of the Deep South, the views 
of powerful actors such as the late Privy Council Chair Prem Tinsulanonda, an attempt to borrow 
from other counterinsurgency successes, and a desire to boost their public relations image have 
convinced military leaders to negotiate, construct an appearance of being peace-makers, and 
engage in other SSR (though without civilian control). In this way they have at least partially 
adopted and practiced concepts of SSR in the Deep South that are globally promoted by reform 
programs in favor of good security governance. However, such adaptations have occurred only 
because of military (and monarchical) preferences, not because of civilian pressure, given that 
Thailand is in 2021 a charade democracy dominated by monarchy and military—which itself 
might be characterized as a “monarchized military” (Chambers/Waitoolkiat 2016). The Thai case 
is thus a peculiar one in terms of studying the processes of SSR translation practices and outcomes. 
It also represents an odd example of local ownership conditions. Nevertheless, precisely these 
peculiar aspects make a closer look significant: Strikingly, even the current quasi-authoritarian 
regime pays tribute to the globally circulating normative discourse on contemporary standards in 
security governance. On the one hand, the junta’s purposeful reference to and practical 
deformation of SSR raises questions about how meaningful the reform concept is in substance. On 
the other hand, the reformed security governance practices in the Deep South allow us to identify 
driving motives for such a security policy, even under authoritarian conditions. Ultimately, 
different applications of SSR can be observed based upon center versus periphery, with the 
distinctive forms of implementation based on different rationales. 
The paper is divided in two sections, looking briefly at the national and then specifically at the 
Deep South levels of analysis. At the national level, it addresses the following questions: First, prior 
to the 2014 military coup, what was the character of the country’s SSR endeavors, how effective 
were these, and what was the role of foreign actors in pushing for SSR? Secondly, since the 2014 
coup, to what extent did the 2014–2019 junta and 2019–present military-dominated government 
achieve the goal of implementing its own translation of SSR in order to bring “order” to Thailand? 
At the Deep South level, it asks the following questions. First, what was the evolution of military 
security policy in the Deep South prior to 2014? Secondly, what has the policy of the ruling 
National Council for Peace and Order military junta toward the Deep South been since the coup of 
2014? Thirdly, what are the non-state SSR actors involved in the Deep South and how has the 
military cooperated with them in Deep South policy? Fourthly, given the advent of dialogue, how 
exactly do state security agencies in the Deep South translate the global norms of the established 
SSR concept and apply these to the Deep South situation, and with what effects? 
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1 THE CONCEPT OF “TRANSLATION” APPLIED TO THE THAI SECURITY ARENA 
SSR can be seen – as we suggest in this research – as a “traveling model” of norms, practices, or 
concepts which are communicated and “translated” across different social, cultural arenas where 
they are then reconceptualized and locally adapted to a particular country (Merry 2006: 38). 
Domestic actors contest with donors and/or among themselves about how SSR is to be understood 
and/or implemented.  
The principal goal of the majority of donors (or Western external actors) is to offer security 
assistance in support of their perception of SSR to local actors, mostly in line with the codified 
OECD catalogue (OECD 2007: 20–21). Nevertheless, “there is an emerging consensus that some 
degree of local ownership is a necessary if not sufficient condition for successful SSR” (Donais 
2009: 124). Meanwhile the primary objective of local actors has been to obtain donor funding for 
security resources. Such a trade-off has often risked the possibility that the latter would only seek 
to pay lip service to the objectives of the external actors. However, in practice, the result is a type of 
transformative bargain in which external and local actors – using official language in support of 
SSR along the lines of presumably universalist values – carry out negotiations on the provision of 
security assistance and SSR which is to be transferred to the local actor. Some local actors accept 
SSR in the form donors intended; other local recipients accept only parts of it; and still others reject 
it completely. The process prods local actors to enact at least parts of the SSR agenda. In the end, 
SSR is either adopted as initially planned, partially adopted, re-interpreted or simply rejected – in 
other words: transformed (Mannitz 2014: 269–285).  
The notion of translation underlines the significance of agency and a non-linear infusion of values 
in terms of what factors determine why different people appropriate values in different ways. 
According to Bruno Latour, when “localizing the global,” the translation of ideas always involves 
some level of “deformation” (Latour 2005: 173). This is because actor-network mediations are 
ensconced in a multiplicity of translations. The “deformation” alluded to by Latour can produce 
accidental or intentional re-interpretations of the original concept. Such reproductions are 
susceptible to translations across different levels of analysis. At a national level there may be one 
particular translation, while at a certain regional level there can be a different form of translation 
altogether (Latour 2005: 173). Moreover, Latour’s notion of “deformation” might be more salient 
at one level than another. SSR is a prime example of such a global narrative which has been 
communicated and translated into extremely diverse local settings. Sometimes SSR translates one 
way at a national level but in a different form at a regional level. Thailand is a case in point. 
Thailand represents one case of a country into which SSR has been translated. Years before the 
2014 coup, SSR concepts were being introduced in the country’s fledgling democracy. However, 
since the putsch the junta has continued to claim adherence to SSR notions. The Thai military has 
engaged in “Latourian deformation,” directly ruling through force while selectively 
communicating and translating the global norm discourse of SSR into local settings. The junta has 
given the notion of SSR new meanings, thus offering conceptual legitimacy to the perpetuation of 
direct military control. Yet at a regional level, in the Deep South, the military appears to be 
practicing what it preaches – adhering to more genuine security governance reforms which have 
replaced some of the previous iron-fisted policy there. Thailand is thus a fascinating case of 
deliberate deformative translation, first, because a military-dominated regime appears to feel that it 
must mask its activities behind SSR, which indicates the high impact in Thailand of this global 
norm, and secondly, because at distinct levels of analysis, the military seems to be implementing 
different levels of SSR translation.  
With regard to methodology, this paper utilized elite interviews, participant observation, official 
documents and secondary literature (Thai and English). These are listed in the bibliography. The 
dearth of interviews results from a problem of feasibility: security considerations. First, the Thai 
junta has not been amenable to researchers conducting interviews about security policy in 
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Thailand. Secondly, insurgents themselves have not made it safe for more interviews to take place. 
Nevertheless, the authors travelled to Thailand’s Deep South several times, conducting interviews, 
collecting information and sitting in meetings designed to build peace among Muslim and 
Buddhist participants.1  
2 MILITARY POLICY AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AT THAILAND’S 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
The security sector has played a foundational and dominant role in the expansion, development 
and consolidation of the kingdom of Thailand. Core security actors are spearheaded by the Royal 
Thai Armed Forces (RTArF). These include the RTArF staff itself, which acts as a formal, though 
ornamental, umbrella above the Royal Thai Army, the Royal Thai Navy, and the Royal Thai Air 
Force. The Royal Thai Army receives by far the highest proportion of the defense budget. With 
over 190,000 personnel, the army is the strongest part of the security sector, and the army 
commander has been the most powerful core security actor (Waitoolkiat/Chambers 2013: 19–23). 
The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) is the smallest service in terms of manpower. The Royal Thai 
Navy is also much smaller than the army and has at times been at odds with the army. Outside the 
RTArF, the Royal Thai Police competes in size with the army (it has 230,000 personnel (Thai PBS 
World 2019)), but has a smaller budget and also has less security hardware such as weapons, 
vehicles and computers. Apart from these formal force structures, paramilitaries (rangers, border 
patrol police, volunteers, marine corps, etc.) stand as a more informal forward guard for the Thai 
state. Ultimately, Thailand boasts 335,425 active-duty military personnel and 292,000 reserve 
personnel, adding up to a total of 627,425 military personnel (Globalfirepower.com 2018). Varying 
degrees of human rights abuses, lack of transparency and accountability, corruption, insulation 
from elected civilian control, and inefficiency have bedeviled each of the security services 
(Transparency International 2015). 
A second part of the security sector involves executive management actors. This area includes the 
Prime Minister’s Office, which heads up the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), the 
National Security Council, the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, the Justice Ministry, and 
the National Intelligence Agency. Since 1998, and more strongly since 2004, the Prime Minister 
has stood directly above the Royal Thai Police (Ratanapinsiri 2013: 510, 512). Finally, the Southern 
Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), established in 1981, has coordinated the army, 
police and ministries in Thailand’s Deep South. 
A third part of Thailand’s SSR has been legislative actors. These are the upper and lower house 
parliamentary committees which, under Thailand’s democratic regimes, have sought to monitor 
the military and police, and security policy. Nevertheless, such supervision has tended to be 
deficient because the elected civilians involved generally lack military expertise. In addition, where 
committee chairs or their members are ex-security officials, they may still be biased in favor of 
military interests (Waitoolkiat/Chambers 2013: 68–69).  
A fourth part of SSR in Thailand has involved financial actors. These include the Finance Ministry, 
the Bureau of the Budget, the National Economic and Social Development Board, and the State 
Audit Commission. Nevertheless, the armed forces possess separate funding sources (e.g. slush 
funds, military enterprises) which cannot be directly controlled by financial actors (Transparency 
International 2015). 
A fifth dimension of SSR in Thailand has involved judicial and supervisory actors. Upwards of 12 
such institutions are legally responsible for ruling upon cases in the area of Thailand’s security 
sector and security forces. Nevertheless, no prosecutions by these bodies have ever led to 
                                                 
1  The authors are indebted to the organizations Deep South Watch and Berghof Foundation and wish to express their 
thanks for these institutions’ assistance. 
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punishments for soldiers and the latest cases ended when the putsch occurred (Transparency 
International 2015). 
A final set of actors has been civil society organizations. These include political parties such as the 
Democrats, NGOs such as the Lawyers Council of Thailand, the Thai Journalists Association, and 
research think tanks such as the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI). 
2.1. Before the 2014 Military Coup d’État 
2.1.1.  Military Policy 
Thirty-five coups and coup attempts from 1911 until 2016 and 53 years of military-dominant 
regimes from 1932 until 2016 bear witness to the reality that Thailand suffers from a legacy of 
strong military influence, while attempts by civilians to challenge such control have been only 
recent and rarely successful (Chambers 2013: 583–587). The years 1992 to 2001 saw the Thai 
military take a backseat to elected civilian rule. Nevertheless, during this period, retired General 
Prem Tinsulanonda, who had risen to become the head of the King’s Privy Council, dominated 
(with the King) Thai politics (Samudavanija 1997: 56). Prem’s influence in politics was arguably a 
continuation of military sway over Thailand, albeit an indirect variant. 
In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra was elected Prime Minister. He succeeded in partially wresting control 
over Thailand’s security forces from Prem, establishing a faction of supporters within the military 
and police (McCargo/Pathmanand 2005: 134–135). He was thus able to establish elected civilian 
control over Thailand’s security forces, although it was personalized control rather than 
institutionalized supremacy. In 2006, Thaksin was ousted in a military coup partly directed by Prem 
(Pathmanand 2008: 129). Though Thaksin remained in self-imposed exile, a pro-Thaksin political 
party won the December 2007 election. But in late 2008, the Constitutional Court dissolved the ruling 
party, paving the way for a new coalition to come together as a new government without an election. 
This coalition, headed by Democrat Abhisit Vechachiwa, was cobbled together through the 
intercession of the Privy Council and arch-Royalist military officers (Rojanaphruk 2008). In the 2011 
general election, Thaksin’s sister Yingluck was elected Prime Minister. 
At the beginning of May 2014, Yingluck was forced from office by Thailand’s Constitutional Court 
and her deputy Niwatthamrong Bunsongphaisan officially replaced her. But on May 20, with large-
scale protests having persisted for over six months and multiple deaths and injuries, Army 
Commander Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha declared martial law under the authority of the 1914 Martial 
Law Act (Phoonphongphiphat 2014). Two days later he seized power outright. 
2.1.2.  Security Sector Reforms Efforts 
SSR has only been implemented in a lackadaisical way in Thailand. Since 1952 there have been US-
funded military/police reforms which embody two dimensions. The first is the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) program. A principal aim of IMET has been to educate 
foreign militaries “to install and maintain democratic values and protect internationally recognized 
human rights in their own government and military” (United States 2013). However, IMET has 
been hindered by insufficient US budgetary finance as well as a general, negative reception given 
the program by the Thai armed forces (Taw 1994: 53). In the meantime, a second US program 
which works with Thai security forces, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), has been introduced. 
FMF provides grants for the acquisition of US defense technology, hardware, and services. But 
obtaining such financing necessitates that Thailand’s security forces “maintain support for 
democratically elected governments that share values similar to the United States for democracy, 
human rights, and regional stability” (United States 2009). Nevertheless, the United States has been 
reluctant to require Thai soldiers to take related classes for fear that this could “create bad” blood 
between the Thai military and Washington (Taw 1994: 31).  
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In 1999, Army Commander Gen. Surayud Chulanond, responding to international pressures, 
commenced military-sponsored SSR. The goal was to build smaller, credible, professional, more 
efficient, more capable, and more transparent armed forces over the following 10 years (Bangkok 
Post 1999). There was also to be a “reallocation of military spending from personnel to 
procurement and training” (Hänggi 2009: 11). Yet Surayud’s SSR plan faded away following the 
2001 election of Thaksin Shinawatra as Prime Minister (Kocak/Kode 2014: 92). 
The September 19, 2006 military coup halted all efforts at Thai SSR. Meanwhile the civilian 
governments ruling between 2008 and 2014 could do very little in terms of SSR (Chambers 2013: 
351–352). Yingluck’s 2011–2014 government tried to distance itself from Army Commander 
Prayuth, relying instead on police to manage security. It also unsuccessfully attempted to appoint 
senior military officials based upon loyalty to Yingluck (The Nation 2011). But the May 22, 2014 
putsch once again ended Thailand’s short-lived democracy. 
2.2.  Military Rule: 2014–2019 
2.2.1.  Military Policy 
Army Commander General Prayuth Chan-ocha seized power on May 22, 2014. Following the 
putsch, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) junta attempted to establish military, 
economic, and political control over Thailand. Proclaiming these strategies to be necessary to bring 
order and efficiency back to the country (when instead they facilitated military domination), these 
tactics provide concrete examples of deformation. First, a Peace Maintaining Force was established 
to arrest and detain potential enemies of the regime. By 2015, this force had placed over 751 Thais 
under arbitrary arrest (Human Rights Watch 2016). By 2016, this number had grown. Secondly, 
military courts now became the most powerful judiciary in Thailand. Such courts involve long pre-
charge and pre-trial detentions, prohibit appeals, can produce harsh sentences, and are closed to 
public observation. The junta also increased the number of prosecutions of persons accused of 
insulting the monarchy (ILAW 2015). Thirdly, the military took control over all state enterprises 
and boosted the number of board memberships offered to senior military brass. The regime 
moreover initiated weekly Friday night television addresses to the nation by Prayuth. Furthermore, 
the junta sponsored nationalistic programs and educational reforms (Thongnoi, July 20, 2014).  
In July, the NCPO enacted a temporary constitution, Thailand’s 19th. It gave amnesty to the coup-
makers (Article 48) and granted complete legal power to the junta leader (Article 44). On March 
31, 2015, Article 44 was substituted for the Martial Law Act of 1914 that had been used since the 
coup to “legally” give the NCPO arbitrary powers over the country. Military officials were given 
power over all other bureaucrats, including police. 
The NCPO voided democratic rights while limiting civil liberties. First, Thais have no right to 
elections at the national or local level. Secondly, there have been severe restrictions on freedom of 
expression, assembly, and association. While political parties were not dissolved, they were 
forbidden to carry out any activities. Political demonstrations of five or more people were banned. 
The NCPO placed extensive restrictions on the media, closing press outlets that criticized its 
actions, blocking many internet websites, and detaining members of the media. Military personnel 
cancelled or monitored academic lectures, and threatened participants with detention. Each 
detention could last (without charge or trial) a maximum of seven days, although detentions could 
be repeated ad nauseam. During detention, soldiers sometimes (allegedly) used torture against 
detainees (US Department of State 2016). The junta placed Thais living abroad deemed to be 
critical of the regime on a list, and threatened family members in Thailand (Asia Sentinel 2016).  
In April 2017, the regime published a junta-approved draft constitution. It called for a non-elected 
Senate, with members directly or indirectly appointed by the junta. This Senate (along with the 
elected Lower House of Representatives) had to approve candidates to be Prime Minister. If any 
amendments were to be made to this constitution, it required the assent of at least 1/3 of the junta-
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appointed Senators. Post-junta governments would have to adhere to a junta-imposed Twenty 
Year National Strategy: veering away from the ambiguous strategy objectives could lead to the 
judicial dissolution of sitting governments. The draft included the possibility of an unelected Prime 
Minister, which could open the door to future military premiers (ICG, August 4, 2020).  
By 2019 the military monopoly over Thailand (under the monarchy) was continuing and the 
country was preparing for elections to be held on March 24 of that year. In the run-up to the 
election, there were allegations of junta gerrymandering (The Nation, November 22, 2018). At the 
same time, commissioners overseeing monitoring agencies such as the Election Commission as 
well as judges on courts such as the Constitutional Court had all been appointed by the junta 
(Kriak-sorn, February 18, 2019). There was no surprise when proxy party Palang Pracharat won 
the election. Since 2019 it has led a ruling coalition with former junta leader General Prayuth 
Chan-ocha as Prime Minister. 
2.2.2. Security Sector Deformation 
So-called “SSR efforts” after the coup consist of a litany of deformations which have ideologically 
entrenched military control over Thailand. These deformations have proceeded precisely because the 
ideology of apparent SSR has been used as a rhetorical tactic by the junta to build popular 
acquiescence to military rule. When talking about Thai security sector “reform,” military officials 
endorse it in order to help Thai security forces “gain more acceptance, domestically and globally.” 
Interestingly, this language seems to imply that SSR, as a translatable norm across the globe, must be 
undertaken by Thailand to appease the “developed countries,” instead of to benefit the Thai people. 
The insinuation is also made that SSR values “must comply” with Thailand’s “context,” thus 
rationalizing any recontextualization of it by Thai security managers (Ministry of Defense 2013).  
In its preferred deformative translation of SSR to Thailand’s local setting, the National Council for 
Peace and Order (NCPO) military regime (and the Prayuth-led successor electoral authoritarian 
regime) has placed emphasis on producing stronger and more efficient security forces. The 
recontextualized meaning of SSR for the Thai junta is to create a powerful military which can 
stimulate an “awe factor” in potential enemies, both domestic and foreign (Areerat 2015). The 
NCPO has supported OECD-proposed SSR objectives such as enhancing effective governance in 
the security system, improving delivery of security and justice services, and sustaining justice and 
security service delivery (OECD 2007: 21). Where the regime has parted ways with this definition 
has been in promoting its “vernacularization”2 of Thailand’s security sector reforms.  
Meanwhile, Thai security force educational institutions, while seeking to promote SSR among 
soldiers, have only concentrated on those SSR efforts which improve military capabilities. 
Consequently, military education represents another type of deform. For example, in September 
2014 a Thai army general from the Strategic Studies Center of the country’s armed forces gave a 
speech at an academic conference in Chiang Mai, Thailand entitled “Rethinking Security Sector 
Reform and Governance in Thailand”. He extolled the junta’s achievements in building greater 
capacity and efficiency as a fighting force and combating non-traditional threats such as natural 
disasters deriving from climate change. But when the general was questioned about when the 
NCPO would return power to elected civilians, he departed from the event.3 Afterwards, possibly 
as a punishment (and in another example of deformation), the junta refused to allow the 
sponsoring College of Law to hold another event it had planned days later. 
                                                 
2  Levitt and Merry define “vernacularization” as “the process of appropriation and local adoption of globally generated 
ideas and strategies” (Levitt/Merry 2009: 441). 
3  Representative. Strategic Studies Center/Royal Thai Armed Forces, “Re-thinking the Security Sector Reform and 
Governance in Thailand (a paper presented at the 8th Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA) 
Congress),” Chiang Mai, Thailand, September 19–20, 2014. 
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3.  MILITARY SECURITY POLICY IN THAILAND’S DEEP SOUTH 
3.1.  Until 2014 
The provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala, as well as four districts of the neighboring Songkhla 
province make up what is collectively referred to as Thailand’s “Deep South”. The region is 
involved in a long-running Malay-Muslim insurgency against Thai rule. Seventy-seven percent of 
the Deep South population is Muslim, while the remainder is Buddhist (Funston 2008: 7). Thai 
security forces are deeply involved in this region.  
Insecurity in this region dates back to 1786, when Siam forcibly subjugated the sultanate of Patani, 
then quelled numerous later insurrections, and divided Patani into seven provinces, ultimately 
incorporating the provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat into Siam in 1902, while ceding the 
four others to Britain in 1904 and 1909 (ICG 2005: 2). The monarchy gave the Siamese army direct 
control over the region in a bid to create order through force.  
From 1902 until 1944, military policy involved using draconian laws and assimilation policies 
against the southern Malay-Muslim community. The Malay language was banned in public offices, 
Malay state employees were required to assume Thai names, Muslim-Malay attire was forbidden in 
public, and Islamic law was no longer allowed to be practiced. At the same time, statues of Buddha 
were placed in schools, and children were forced to bow before them (ICG 2005: 3). 
But state repression simply fuelled continuing resistance in the Deep South. Thus, between 1946 and 
2014, Thailand’s military involved themselves in six principal reform efforts in the Deep South 
region. These occurred in 1946, 1980–85, 2001–04, 2009–11, 2006–07 and 2011–14, respectively. The 
fact that so many changes in security policy occurred illustrates its lack of sustainability over time. 
In 1980–1985, Prime Minister Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda (1980) issued Order 66/2523 which – 
following US counterinsurgency doctrine – established that political methods would henceforth 
take precedence over repression when combating insurgency (carried out in the Deep South as the 
Thai Romyen policy) (Kraisoraphong 2013: 5–6), sought to improve security institutions by 
making them more efficient, focused on building trust with moderate Malay-Muslim leaders 
(“Wadah” faction), merged the objectives of Deep South state agencies, gave amnesty to former 
insurgents who were willing to live under Thai law, and worked more closely with Malaysia to 
secure the Thai-Malay border. To improve the efficiency of security forces and merge agencies 
working with local Deep South leaders, Prem in 1981 established Task Force CPM 43 (which 
coordinated security operations among civilians, police, and the military) and created the Southern 
Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) (ICG 2005: 11–12).  
The third security reform (2001–2004), carried out by elected Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, 
saw Thailand dismantle CPM 43 and SBPAC (which Thaksin viewed as giving their loyalty to his 
opponent, ex-Premier and now Privy Council chairperson Prem (McCargo 2007: 39) in 2002, and 
place control over southern security matters in the hands of police commanders, exacerbating 
tensions between the army and police, while police were accused of increased human rights abuses 
in the south. However, the 2004 upsurge in insurgency forced Thaksin to return to relying 
principally on the military, issue (in March 2004) Order 68/2547 (followed by Order 260/2547 and 
200/2548) to establish the Southern Border Provinces Peacebuilding Command (SBBPC) (similar 
to the previous SBPAC but directly controlled by the Prime Minister rather than the army) 
(Funston 2008: 25; Waitoolkiat/Chambers 2013: 35–39), and attempt diplomacy with 
representatives of five Muslim insurgent groups, as mediated by Malaysia, although the talks were 
unsuccessful (Bhukari 2006). 
The 2006 coup-appointed regime of Gen. Surayud Chulanond implemented Thailand’s fourth 
security reform in the Deep South, which included reestablishment of the Southern Border 
Provinces Administrative Committee and Civil-Military-Police Task Force to coordinate security 
and political policies on the ground in the south, both of which were again placed under the army-
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controlled ISOC, which meant that army commanders would again be in command in the Deep 
South. Surayud discarded Thaksin’s negotiations with Deep South insurgents, partly because of the 
earlier peace plan’s promise to establish an independent tribunal to try security officials for alleged 
human rights violations and at first commenced his own half-hearted peace talks (dubbed the 
“Geneva Process”), but when these negotiations proved futile (Bhukari 2006) the state returned to 
a more repressive policy in the Deep South (Jitpiromsri/McCargo 2010: 159–160). 
The fifth security reform, that of civilian Prime Minister Abhisit Vechachiwa (2008–2011), 
included the proclamation of a new paradigm called “Politics Leading the Military”, which would 
henceforth place elected civilians ahead of the military in terms of formulating policies to resolve 
the crisis in the Deep South. This policy shift led Abhisit to try to take the Southern Border 
Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) out of the control of the military, instead making it 
directly answerable to the Prime Minister, ostensibly to produce unified delivery of policing 
(although the military still managed to maintain control over Deep South policy, albeit informally) 
(Askew 2010: 248–249).  
The last pre-2014 security reform regarding the Deep South occurred in 2011 following the 
election of Yingluck Shinawatra. Yingluck benefited from the proposal of her predecessor Abhisit 
to transfer the SBPAC from under the control of the army (ISOC Region 4 Forward Command 
which reported to the Army Chief) and place it under the Prime Minister. This reform – 
implemented in 2011 – meant that ISOC would no longer control the SBPAC’s budget. However, 
the revamped SBPAC continued to hold less power than ISOC, given that ISOC (and the army) 
remained insulated from civilian control, were informally in charge of Deep South policy, and 
possessed a larger budget than the SBPAC. 
Reviving her brother Thaksin’s policy preferences, Yingluck gave the Royal Thai Police a leading 
role in the Deep South, through a new police-led Southern Border Provinces Problem Solving and 
Development Centre (SBPSDC), designed to implement policies to quell the violence. Army Chief 
Prayuth was appointed deputy chairperson. Given that the police were directly under the 
supervision of the Office of Prime Minister (while the military was more insulated from executive 
control), this move could be interpreted as a security sector reform, since it increased civilian 
control over security forces in the Deep South (The Nation 2011). 
Finally, in 2013 Yingluck’s government – with reluctant support from the military – agreed to a 
direct dialogue with a segment of the Malay-Muslim insurgents. This agreement, facilitated by 
Malaysia, led to three talks, although they were eventually discontinued as the Thai government 
became distracted by massive opposition political demonstrations in Bangkok. The talks were also 
hampered by the fact that Yingluck received little cooperation in support of the negotiations from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Thai Army (ISOC) or the National Intelligence Agency. 
Moreover, given that Yingluck’s government only negotiated with one insurgent group, there was 
little to stop continuing attacks by other insurgent organizations (Boonpunth 2015: 121). 
3.2.  Since 2014 
Thailand’s May 22, 2014 military coup, establishment of martial law and the implementation of 
deformative tactics to embed long-term military influence all suggested that the 2014–2019 junta 
and post-2019 electoral authoritarian regime would cut short any moves toward finding peace in 
the Deep South, including the continuation of negotiations. The new NCPO appeared suspicious 
of peace talks in the region. NCPO leader Prayuth and other army officials had earlier shown little 
enthusiasm for the 2013 negotiations (ICG 2015: 13). Thus, the chances that the NCPO would 
push forward with negotiations seemed doubtful.  
Yet despite the 2014 coup, the junta implemented non-deformative SSR for the Deep South 
involving institutional and resource changes, elite-level dialogue, support for peace initiatives at 
the level of civil society (including those sponsored by the Berghof Foundation), as well as 
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alterations in troop levels and budgeting. The changed policy seemed to be guided by a bottoms-up 
approach which created the impression that the NCPO had learned from the military’s previous 
errors in focusing on repression in the region. 
By mid-2015 new negotiations had begun. Indeed the military appeared to be pursuing a two-
pronged policy of repressive (deformative) counterinsurgency measures amid SSR-based support 
for new peace talks. The junta organized 206 civil society “peace forums,” which included 
participants “who hold different views from the state” (Benjakat 2016). However, there was an 
increase in army arrests and targeted raids on villages or venues deemed to be hotbeds of sympathy 
for the rebellion. Prayuth even ambitiously promised to end the far-south conflict by the end of 
2015 (Phuket News 2014). 
3.2.1.  Institutional and Resource Modifications 
Immediately following the 2014 coup, the new junta began implementing SSR-based alterations to 
state policy towards the Deep South which involved changes in institutions as well as resources 
(e.g. troops and budget). On May 30, 2014 the junta initiated drastic changes in Thailand’s Deep 
South policy. First, it issued Announcement 34/2557. The decree declared that the SBPAC would 
be placed directly under the jurisdiction of the junta leader, voiding the 2010 law that had made 
the SBPAC into an independent agency. In other words, the SBPAC was placed back under the 
control of ISOC, as managed by the Fourth Army Command (NCPO 34/2557; INSa 2014). Then, 
on July 21, the NCPO enacted Announcements 96/2557 and 96/2557. 
The decrees enshrined a three-level organization for dealing with the southern crisis. At the top 
tier of this structure was the level of policy formulation spearheaded by junta leader/Prime 
Minister Prayuth assisted by the National Security Council Secretary General as secretary. The 
second level was the tier which coordinated government strategies towards the Deep South. Such 
co-ordination was managed by a Steering Committee to Resolve the Protracted Southern Unrest 
Problem, as managed by Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan. Finally, the third level was 
the policy implementation tier, and it was overseen by the Fourth Army regional commander 
(directly in charge of the Deep South) (ICG 2015: 14; NCPO 96/2014; NCPO 98/2014). Thus, 
following the 2014 coup, Deep South policy was completely transferred from control by civilian 
administrators to military bureaucrats.  
In addition to this structure, following the coup, in late July 2014 under Decree 96/2557 a new Ad 
Hoc Committee Structure for Extinguishing the Crisis in the Deep South (CSDS  ) was established. 
This structure, under the direct control of the Royal Thai Army Commander, was presided over by 
a committee and managed by a secretariat. Under the Secretariat, three organs of state coordinated 
different areas, working with the local civilian population. The first, ISOC, was directly responsible 
for coordinating the Safety in Life and Welfare Promotion Group – in other words military 
security. The second, the SBPAC, was tasked with overseeing four groups: justice, facilitation of 
understanding, education, and development/commerce in the Deep South. The third, the National 
Security Council, was charged with overseeing the Policy Efficiency Group and the “Searching for 
Exits from Divisions” Group (INSb, August 4, 2014). Through these groups, the CSDS sought to 
promote discussions in general; discussions about laws, discussions about politics, and discussions 
about reducing violence. CSDS structure was divided into three hierarchical parts. On paper, 
ISOC, the SBPAC and the NSC looked balanced in their CSDS authority. However, ISOC, with its 
control over military security in the Deep South and post-coup domination of the SBPAC and 
NSC, became the effective veto holder in the CSDS, enshrining military supremacy over civilian 
decision making in Deep South policy. 
Although the Martial Law Act was lifted across the country on April 1, 2015, it was replaced with 
Section 44 of the 2014 interim constitution. This section grants the NCPO chief overwhelming 
power over Thailand. The Executive Decree for Public Administration in Emergency Situations 
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2005 remains in force in all districts of the three conflict-ridden provinces except for one in Pattani 
and four in Songkla, where the Internal Security Act 2008 is in force. 
Meanwhile, the junta increased the number of combat personnel and the amount of funding for 
counterinsurgency in the region. Indeed, in 2015 and 2016 it increased the 60,000 troops deployed in 
the region to over 70,000 security forces. These included approximately 32,500 soldiers, including 
numerous Taharn Phran Rangers under army command as well as a small number of navy and 
Marine Corps officials. Included in the total were roughly 18,600 Royal Thai Police, although this 
number included the Border Patrol Police under Royal Thai Police control. Finally, there were exactly 
9,680 Or Sor Volunteers, under the Ministry of the Interior (Source: ISOC 2015; 2016). 
Apart from the troops just mentioned, there are two types of state militia in the Deep South. The 
first are the nearly 25,000 Or Ror Bor Village Protection Volunteers (Jitpiromsri 2013: 562–563), 
although exact figures remain unclear, since there is no up-to-date official state source for verifying 
these speculations. The other militia in the Deep South is the Chor Ror Bor Self-Defense 
Volunteers. Ultimately, each of Thailand’s 2,050 villages is supposed to have 30 Chor Ror Bor 
Volunteers. While in theory this number could thus exceed 60,000 persons, in 2008 only 1,218 
villages had such volunteers. Since then, no official state figures have been made available for the 
number of volunteer forces. As a result, we can only estimate that approximately 60,000 Chor Ror 
Bor could exist in Thailand’s Deep South in 2015. Beyond these two militias there are other, 
smaller state militia groups, including the “Iron Lady Unit,” initiated by the Queen in October 
2005. This all-female militia was tasked to “train women in Pattani province in self-protection and 
use of firearms” (Sarosi/Sombutpoonsiri 2009: 14–15). 
Despite the Thai junta’s investment in additional soldiers, October 2016 saw it move to begin 
outsourcing principal security tasks to the local paramilitary volunteers – the Or Sor, Or Ror Bor 
and Chor Ror Bor – working alongside army officials and rangers. Twelve ranger regiments would 
remain in the region as would as many as 18 army battalions. However, four military battalions 
would be withdrawn. The rationale for this SSR – dubbed the Tung Yang Daeng model – was to 
increasingly localize the counterinsurgency. In the past, rebels have demonstrated a preference for 
attacking non-local state security officials rather than local ones (Pathan 2016; Senwong 2016). 
Volunteers are familiar with local terrain and are better accepted by local Malay-Muslim people 
than soldiers from outside the Deep South. However, rangers (and to some extent volunteers), with 
less training than regular soldiers, have generally committed more human rights violations than 
regular military officials (ICG 2007: 8, 14; Pathan 2016). 
With regard to financing counterinsurgency (under the country’s 2015–2021 National Security 
Policy), in 2016, Thailand’s budget across all ministries “to douse the southern fire,” which includes 
enhanced security infrastructure, was estimated to be 30.51 billion baht (US$865,323,400). This 
marked an increase of US$115.3 million from 2015, when the figure was estimated to be 25.68 billion 
baht (US$750 million), which itself had represented an increase of approximately US$44 million 
from 2014, when it was 24.15 billion baht (US$685 million) (ICG 2015: 15, footnote 85; Bureau 2014; 
Bureau 2015). In fact, this figure has grown each year since the Deep South insurgency escalated in 
2004. The growth of this budget coincides with a vast increase in defense spending for 2016, a major 
objective of which is counterinsurgency in the Deep South. Indeed, in 2016, for the first time, the 
Thai army and police each had an annual budget of more than 100 billion baht. For police services, 
the budget was 106,900,000,000 baht (see Bureau of the Budget, 2016: 205–209, 299). Within the 
Office of the Prime Minister, there was an increase in spending for ISOC and its related programs, 
most of which were also part of the counterinsurgency campaign. In 2015, the overall ISOC budget 
had been 8,906,478,600 Thai baht (US$252.7 million), but in 2016 this amount grew to 
10,200,971,600 Thai baht (US$291,285,888) (Bureau 2016: 205–209, 299).  
In all, from 2004 until 2016, the amount of money spent by the state to rectify the Deep South 
emergency totalled around 264,953,000,000 baht (US$7,517,789,670) (INS 2016). The Deep South 
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insurgency during this period represented a veritable gold mine for Thai security forces in terms of 
increased budgetary allocations. 
Aside from the budget, the Deep South counterinsurgency has also facilitated informal financial 
gains for military officials. These allegedly include oil smuggling, drug smuggling, human 
trafficking and corruption. Regarding oil smuggling, Malaysian racketeers have reportedly shipped 
illegal oil supplies across the Thai-Malaysian border to sell at cheaper prices in Thailand. Many 
Thai security officials have allegedly accepted bribes as part of the business, estimated to be worth 
between 50–100 billion baht annually. Some of the oil racketeers are also allegedly involved in 
narcotics smuggling. Oil smuggling may also have been used to fund Deep South insurgent groups 
(INSc, August 14, 2014). Human trafficking is another lucrative racket from which Thai security 
officials stationed in the Deep South have reportedly profited. According to one source, “Yala is 
reputed to be the heartland of human trafficking in Thailand” (Sidasathian/Morison 2015). Finally, 
corruption in the Thai military in the Deep South has persisted (e.g. the proliferation of “ghost 
soldiers” (non-existent soldiers, with salaries going to commanders)) (Transparency International 
2015). 
Ultimately, though military and police officials have enjoyed formal (budgetary) and informal 
(illicit) financial gains as a result of the unrest, at the same time most senior-level officers realize 
that the costs of counter insurgency are depleting the economy, and many thus want a rapid end to 
the insurrection. 
3.2.2.  Military Support for Elite-Level Dialogue 
In the course of these administrative, organizational and budgetary changes, the NCPO slowly agreed 
to participate in a dialogue with insurgents. Only in December 2014, under prodding from the 
international community, did Prayuth (who sought global acceptance of the NCPO) formally agree 
with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak to three principles that would restart negotiations: a 
period of no violence before talks could commence, inclusion of all insurgent groups, and unity in 
rebel demands. The regime had earlier, on November 26, 2014, decreed Prime Ministerial Order 
230/2557, which mandated the creation of a junta mechanism for peace dialogue.  
This structure possessed three levels. At the top was a steering committee for the peace dialogue, 
chaired by junta leader/Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha. Under this was a peace dialogue panel, 
which represented the actual representatives who were to participate in talks with the insurgents. 
Its chair and chief negotiator was Gen. Aksara Kerdpol. Finally, at the bottom was the area-based 
inter-agency coordination working group, which was chaired by the Royal Thai Army Fourth 
Region Commander (Al-Hakim 2015a).  
Then, on May 13, 2015, it was reported that six Malay-Muslim resistance groups in southern 
Thailand, with the assistance of Malaysia, had formed an umbrella organization called the Majilis 
Syura Patani (Patani Consultative Council or MARA Patani). The grouping included three PULO 
factions, the Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani (BIPP), Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate 
(BRN) and the Gerakan Mujahideen Islami Patani (GMIP) (BenarNews, May 13, 2015). MARA 
Patani’s avowed purpose is to participate in peace talks with Thailand, “gain recognition and 
international support for the Right to Self-determination for the people of Patani,” and to maintain 
what all participating insurgent groups ascribed to the claim for independence (Al-Hakim 2015b). 
The establishment of MARA also appeared to match one requirement of the December 2014 
Prayuth-Razak communiqué. MARA Patani’s expressed goal is independence for the Deep South 
three-province region. However, it is likely that the group would accept a form of regional 
autonomy from Thailand. Three months later, in early June 2015, the first in a new series of 
negotiations between Thailand and the insurgents MARA Patani quietly commenced in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. The new round was reportedly started and backed by Prayuth himself 
(Kummetha, June 18, 2015). 
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By February 2016, it was reported that 80 to 90 percent of the Terms of References (TOR) – 
agreements which must precede the formal peace negotiations – had been completed (Prachatai, 
February 1, 2016). The junta for its part now appeared to be demonstrating that it was serious 
about pushing for pragmatic conciliation as part of the military’s SSR in the Deep South. Then in 
April, Thai junta leader Prayuth transferred Gen. Nakrob Bunbuathong from his position as 
deputy director of ISOC Unit 5, removing him from the Thai negotiation team. Other team 
members were also replaced. Nakrob was the most experienced member of the Thai team, spoke 
the local Malay-Muslim dialect, and had been the member most deeply immersed in technical 
parts of the talks (Rakkanam/Yusof 2016). His transfer allegedly resulted from his tendency to 
appear overly moderate in meetings with MARA Patani (Bangkok Post, April 24, 2016).  
Following Nakrob’s ouster, the Thai junta announced that it needed to review the TOR to ensure 
that the negotiations complied with international law before it would allow the meetings of the 
Joint Working Group-Peace Dialogue Process (JWG-PDP) to continue. The regime was annoyed 
by MARA Patani’s insistence that a ceasefire must come before any confidence-boosting measures 
(Prachatai, May 9, 2016). 
With the dialogue temporarily suspended, violence between the state and insurgent groups 
intensified. In the first 10 days of August alone, insurgents engaged in 50 bomb attacks in the Deep 
South. Although the violence was related to the breakdown of negotiations, it was also related to 
the impending August 7 referendum on a new military-backed constitution. Rebels scribbled anti-
constitution graffiti at locations throughout the region (Engvall 2016). The result of the 
referendum, though on a national level a victory at the polls for the military regime, represented an 
overwhelming “No” among voters in the Deep South. The rationale was probably two-fold. First, 
the proposed Article 67 appeared to show that the state would henceforth give priority to 
supporting Buddhism (The Nation 2016). Secondly, the result possibly showed that most Deep 
South voters did not favor a draft constitution which would establish military power until possibly 
2023 – destroying the chances for people in the region to work out a negotiated settlement with a 
democratically elected government. 
Then, only four days after the referendum, coordinated arson and bombing attacks in seven 
southern Thai provinces killed four people and injured 35 more. The attacks were seen by most 
experts to be the work of Deep South insurgents (Wheeler 2016). If so, they marked a dangerous 
turn toward insurgents perpetrating attacks not only in the Deep South but all across Thailand. 
In the post-bombings environment, Thailand’s junta hardened its position, with Prayuth now 
demanding that insurgents first cease all violence and merge into one group before any 
negotiations could resume. He also said that the state would move toward imposing Thai 
language education in all schools in the Deep South (Prachatai, August 29, 2016). Despite this 
tough talk, the two sides held another round of informal talks on September 2, and came away 
with an agreement on a new version of the TOR. The agreement included plans to discuss 
regional safety zones and the unofficial continuation of the peace dialogue (Bangkok Post, 
September 3, 2016). The continuing negotiations show that the military is either truly interested 
in using dialogue to settle the Deep South crisis or it has drawn upon notions of SSR to build up 
a favorable domestic and international public image while simultaneously engaging in the 
forceful prosecution of insurrection. 
In 2017, violence between insurgents and security forces continued unabated. Since 2004, the conflict 
has witnessed 6,400 killings and 11,500 injuries (Deep South Watch 2017). Statistics for 2014 showed 
that of 6,097 deaths, most were among the Muslim population. As for injuries, there were 10,908, 
suffered mostly by Buddhists (Jitpiromsri 2014). In late 2016, the figures for killed and wounded grew 
to almost 7,000 and at least 12,000, respectively (CCSCD 2016). Regarding people displaced by the 
Deep South conflict, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates an 
approximate number of 35,000 as of April 2015, although that number could be three times higher. 
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IDMC also estimated a 20 to 50 percent reduction in the Buddhist population and a 10 percent drop 
in the Malay-Muslim population from the Deep South (IDMC 2015). 
Amid increased numbers of dead, wounded, and displaced persons, allegations of torture by the 
military have skyrocketed. In February 2016, two reports, one issued by the Muslim Attorney Center 
Foundation and another by the Cross Cultural Foundation, Network of Human Rights Organizations 
and Duay Jai Group, similarly listed a litany of army torture techniques. According to the latter 
report, torture has been “done systematically […] it is destroying confidence in the structure of the 
state [contributing to more Malay-Muslims] joining the violent struggle” (Rojanaphruk 2016). 
However, instead of launching an investigation into the accusations in order to improve security 
force performance, Thailand’s military charged three of the authors with criminal defamation 
(Bangkok Post, July 26, 2016). Such an attitude suggests that the armed forces are as yet unwilling to 
give consideration to and respect human rights in their treatment of prisoners. 
3.2.3. Military Support for Internationally Backed, Non-Elite-Level Reconciliation  
Meanwhile, since the growth in state repression in the Deep South in 2004, international players 
such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the United States, the European Union, 
Japan, Malaysia, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have continuously urged 
Thailand to reform military policy and respect the human rights of Malay-Muslims in the region 
(see, for example, Tansubhapol 2012). For the most part, the Thai state has forbidden international 
organizations from becoming involved in reducing tensions in the Deep South periphery owing to 
fears that the insurgency might gain more legitimacy among the international community. 
However, in 2013, the Yingluck government did agree to allow the low-profile Berghof Foundation 
to initiate a program of promoting accommodation between Muslims and Buddhists at the Deep 
South’s non-elite level. These efforts would permit deliberations that do not take place on a 
national level. Following the 2014 coup, the NCPO allowed Berghof’s program to continue. 
Berghof itself is an independent, internationally operating (established in Germany), non-
governmental organization which “supports efforts to prevent political and social violence, and to 
achieve sustainable peace through conflict transformation” (Berghof 2017a). 
In an interview, the Deep South representative of Berghof stated the following:  
The military junta must be congratulated for committing itself to a peace dialogue with 
MARA Patani. Nevertheless, the junta’s policy of combining peace efforts with more 
military counterinsurgency is not good for building trust and confidence. But in the end 
how can any Deep South peace talks be successful without the participation of the military 
given that it has so much authority in the region? To achieve peace, Thailand’s junta (and 
succeeding regimes) will have to follow a multi-track policy: support from the military, 
Thaksin Shinawatra; support from southern NGOs, peace negotiations, and moves by 
politicians in parliament to realistically look for peace in the far southern region. On that 
last point, I want to add that talks on secession need to be decriminalized. Thai party 
politics should allow for the creation of political parties within southern Thailand or an 
election system which can boost the voice of voters in Thailand’s Deep South (Berghof 
representative interview, 2015; anonymized). 
One strategy which Berghof has supported is the Peace Education for Conflict Management by 
Local Communities in Southern Thailand. This “Peace College” is designed to raise general 
awareness among local pro-peace activists about global peace initiatives.  
A second strategy backed by Berghof is the Platform of Insider Peacebuilders (IPP). The purpose of 
IPP is to assemble Thai-Buddhists, Thai-Chinese, Malay-Muslims and people with different 
political views who are all interested in achieving peace in Thailand’s Deep South (Berghof 2017b). 
We attended and participated in two of the IPP sessions in which there were 38 participants and 44 
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participants, respectively.4 We noticed that a local Thai army colonel was in attendance as a 
participant representing the Thai state in seeking to build bridges toward peace. He told us that 
either he or other army officers always attended and participated in the IPP sessions (RTA colonel 
interview, 2016). Despite deformative tendencies of the junta at Thailand’s center, the NCPO’s 
support for and even participation in Berghof’s peace initiatives illustrates a break with past 
military refusal to seek Buddhist-Muslim understanding at the Deep South’s non-elite level. 
Berghof’s initiatives are thus indirectly becoming important parts of the junta’s SSR strategy in the 
Deep South periphery.  
3.2.4. Analyzing Post-2014 SSR in the Deep South 
Ultimately, since the 2014 military coup, the 2014–2019 junta and its 2019-present electoral 
authoritarian successor seem to have followed a policy of officially functioning as a more 
conciliatory actor through the use of Western-originated SSR notions (except for civilian control 
of the military) to unobtrusively deliver security to the Deep South while unofficially continuing a 
repressive military strategy in the region. Through the use of more efficient institutions in the 
Deep South, elite-level and non-elite-level peace talks, as well as military tactics, the junta is 
borrowing from other models of state negotiations with ethnic armies such as the Philippine 
experience in Mindanao, the Indonesian experience in Aceh, and the Myanmar model of 
negotiations with ethnic armies – all of which used military force and negotiations accompanied by 
limited concessions. Such models have been praised by international SSR donors since they at least 
offer the chance of peaceful conflict resolution. The military even contends that it has sought to 
reduce its own abuses in the Deep South (e.g., corruption, human rights violations) that have 
inflamed local grievances, especially the grievances of the majority Malay-Muslims. The 
mechanisms used include military courts, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) and 
the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC), all of which can punish security officials 
found guilty of illegal mistreatment of civilians. Although the military’s apparent conciliation and 
restraint in the Deep South could be merely a public relations ploy, it is still showing itself to be 
quite interested in continuing the talks as well as expanding the role of civil society in the region. 
There were several likely motives behind the junta’s strategy. These include, first, the influence of 
Prem Tinsulanonda and the monarch for an expedited Deep South solution. Second, the junta may 
believe that it can successfully borrow from the experiences of other militaries that have also long 
been engaged in counterinsurgency (e.g., Aceh, Indonesia; southern Philippines; Karen State, 
Myanmar). Third, the Thai junta may regard a public appearance of conciliation and its embrace 
of modest reforms over past repression (which to some extent reflects Western conceptions of 
SSR) as good public relations, both domestically and in the international community.  
3.3.  Viewpoints of Security Officials toward Security Policy in the Deep South 
Alongside Thailand’s security policy in the Deep South are the viewpoints of security actors 
themselves. These are significant given that it is these officials who interpret and implement state 
policy on the ground in the troubled region. To understand these perspectives, we interviewed 
representatives of the army, police and paramilitaries – the security services at the forefront of the 
counterinsurgency.  
We first talked to senior army officials. The two are part of the senior group of military officials 
who oversee all armed forces operations in the Deep South and they themselves have served in the 
region for several years. With Gen. Poolsuwat nodding his head in agreement, Gen. Suwannathat 
told us the following:  
                                                 
4  Authors attended two sessions of the Insider Peacebuilders’ Platform (IPP), Berghof Foundation, held at Prince of 
Songkla University, Pattani, Thailand, March 26–27, 2016. 
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17 ministries and 65 departments are involved in resolving the counterinsurgency. The state 
is allocating two trillion baht to pacifying the conflict. The 2014 coup represented a change 
for the better in Thai Deep South policy. The coup united the Thai state with regard to 
Deep South policy. With the military ruling Thailand, the security sector has become more 
efficient in the Deep South and SSR have been rapidly implemented there. Thailand under 
democracy could never achieve successful results in the Deep South (Suwannathat and 
Poolsawad 2016). 
These two generals appeared to be trying to produce a positive assessment of Thai military policy 
in the Deep South. They also tried to contend that the 2014 coup which ended Thai democracy was 
something which was quite beneficial to SSR in the region. 
Secondly, we interviewed two intermediate-level army officers who wanted to stay anonymous. 
The two officers have worked as part of Thai military operations in the Deep South for over 10 
years. The first told us the following:  
Since the 2014 coup, the new Ad Hoc Committee Structure for Extinguishing the Crisis in 
the Deep South, CSDS, has been very helpful to peace in the region because it has been very 
inclusive, bringing together different functional sectors, including the grassroots, NGOs, 
and military. But we [Thai security forces] still suffer from obstacles that prevent us from 
achieving quick success in counterinsurgency. First, Thailand’s tragic Red-Yellow conflict 
has gotten in the way of Deep South resolution. Secondly, there has been inconsistency in 
policy in the Deep South owing to the overrotation of 4th Region commanders. Thirdly, 
there is the secretive nature of the insurgents and their use of guerilla warfare makes it 
difficult to quickly defeat them. Fourthly, the Thai military is misapplying 
counterinsurgency strategy, using decades-old anti-communist counterinsurgency tactics to 
combat the Malay-Muslim secessionist insurgents. But in fact, the Deep South insurgents 
are very different than were the Thai communists. Fifthly, Thai policy-makers in the Deep 
South have been notoriously inept. Those army officials with any real knowledge have little 
voice over policy. Sixthly, there has been a lack of collaboration among state security 
agencies. Seventh, police stick too much to the law. That could create a problem because the 
law simply cannot solve the problems of the Deep South (RTA Interview 2015). 
Upon the first officer’s mention of the police, the second energetically jumped into the 
conversation to add:  
Actually, there is no collaboration between the military and police. The military knows 
what tactics to use to pacify the insurgency but the military does not know the law. The 
police, on the other hand, know the law but nothing else and the two institutions can thus 
never successfully collaborate. The two do not talk enough so it is difficult to work together 
to resolve the problems of the Deep South (RTA interview 2015). 
These interview partners, while presenting a positive picture of army counterinsurgency efforts in 
the Deep South, seemed to be very frank, critical of what they perceived as security deficiencies 
(especially among the police), and willing to talk at length about them. In this respect, they differed 
from the senior army officers whom we also interviewed. They also seemed to blame police for 
deficiencies but demonstrated that there are disparate voices within the security forces regarding 
policy in the region. 
Thirdly, we interviewed two members of the Royal Thai Police, who also provided information on 
the condition of anonymity. One of the two has worked in the Deep South for several years; the 
other has only worked in the Deep South for one year. They presented a different perspective from 
the military interviewees. The first one spoke as follows:  
[T]he duties of the police regarding security policy in the Deep South are to protect lives, 
welfare and property of the people in the troubled region. Moreover, police must collect 
evidence and prove it in investigations. The rest of the job amounts to being a facilitator in 
the area of justice. The annual budget for Deep South police operations in 2015 is 
1,878,821,700 baht (SBPPOC 2016). The NCPO has offered more financial support than 
did the Yingluck government. Nevertheless, when compared to other security agencies, the 
budget provided for the police is proportionally smaller than that given to the military and 
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the Interior Ministry’s Volunteers paramilitary. As for drawbacks of police budgeting, the 
police have few personnel actually involved in budgeting. Most police are expected to do 
field work, not desk work in policy and planning. So they are not trained enough to make 
and sustain a budget. Finally, though both the police and army suffer from corruption and 
lack of transparency, the fact that the Defense Ministry need not abide by the strict 
budgetary rules helps the military get around legal obstacles that police cannot avoid.  
The second police interviewee added the following information: 
Another weakness of police in the Deep South is that there has tended to be no policy 
consistency for police. Though the crisis suddenly grew in 2004, police have tended to 
adopt policies based upon short-term experiences in the Deep South rather than using any 
entrenched policy paradigm. Actually, army officials try to dominate Deep South policy, do 
not put enough effort into cooperating with police, tend to use violent repression before 
considering moderate state responses, and, because of this, are the second most detested 
security agency, after the Rangers, by most Malay-Muslims of the Deep South (RTP 
interview, 2015). 
These two police officers were perhaps the most cynical of the security officials we interviewed, 
blaming the army for being too heavy-handed in the Deep South and preventing police from 
fulfilling their responsibility to maintain law and order. In fact, as with the intermediate-level army 
officers we interviewed, they offered critical assessments that the senior military officials to whom 
we talked did not reveal. 
Finally, we turned to the perspective of paramilitary Or Sor (volunteers). This interviewee is a 
Buddhist who has served as a security official in the Deep South for several years. He was 
previously a paramilitary Ranger but became an Or Sor. The interviewee stated the following:  
[T]he policy of the NCPO is much better than that of Yingluck because hers was too vague. 
Prayuth’s policy also has more stability. Moreover, Prayuth has closely followed up the facts 
on the ground. Regarding policy weaknesses, the state over the years has been unable to 
maintain policy stability and unity. Policy stability depends mostly upon the Prime Minister 
but also the 4th Army Commander. There has also been a rift among state agencies, 
including the SBPAC, ISOC, National Security Council, the 4th Army Region headquarters 
and the Royal Thai Police. Regarding the paramilitary rangers, they are deficient in counter-
intelligence, tend to excessively corner the enemy and are not well-liked by local Malay-
Muslims. In the past, the state recruited rangers from the local population since local people 
know the local situation. However, now the state increasingly recruits rangers from outside 
the Deep South. These “non-local rangers” do not know the local situation as well as locally-
recruited rangers. A major problem in the rangers has been corruption whereby local 
commanders sometimes create “ghost soldiers,” filling out their roster of troops with more 
soldiers than really exist and then personally collecting excess salaries and benefits. The 
Black Uniformed Gentleman Supap-burut Chut Dam Rangers policy started in 2009. 
Rangers would not be so abusive or intimidating. In other words, rangers must “be 
gentlemen.” But this change makes rangers more vulnerable to danger, creates more danger 
for rangers. Regarding volunteers, though they work with the military, police and rangers in 
the Deep South, their responsibilities are unclear. Volunteer salaries are too meager. We 
receive about 4,000 baht per month, forcing us to locate additional careers to supplement 
our salary (Or Sor interview 2015). 
This informant appeared to be generally supportive of the state’s efforts at counterinsurgency in 
the Deep South. His criticisms were more specific such as in terms of bureaucratic politics, 
malfeasance, and the need to respect human rights. The fact that his salary is so low (requiring the 
need for an extra job) is interesting: financial needs have compelled some paramilitary officials to 
perform work in private security or even in informal – sometimes illegal – labor (e.g., human 
trafficking). 
Based upon the interviews in this study, officials from the army, police and paramilitaries, and 
volunteers all seem united in expressing the need to quell Thailand’s Deep South insurrection as 
quickly as possible. However, they all admitted to continuing security sector problems in the 
region. At the same time, all generally expressed at least superficial support for dialogue with 
18 
   
PRIF Working Paper No. 52 
insurgents. Such a mindset illustrates that, although they have enjoyed receiving funding for 
counterinsurgency operations, Thai security forces may have come to the realization that brute 
force alone is not a viable policy in the Deep South. 
4. MILITARY COOPERATION EFFORTS WITH DOMESTIC NON-STATE ACTORS IN 
THE DEEP SOUTH 
Since the upsurge in violence in 2004, Thailand’s military has actively promoted working with local 
(domestic) non-state stakeholders who are amenable to achieving a peace in the Deep South that 
recognizes continued sovereignty over the region by the Thai state. Such collaboration efforts 
intensified during the formal negotiations held by the Yingluck government in 2013, persisted after 
the 2014 coup and have continued under the 2019-present Prayuth Chan-ocha electoral 
authoritarian regime. Nevertheless, friction has sometimes occurred between the military and 
Deep South civil society. Actors willingly or reluctantly cooperating with the Thai government 
include local Muslim groups, Buddhist organizations, NGOs, journalists, academics, and 
politicians. Representatives from each of these stakeholders necessarily have specific perceptions of 
Thai security policy in the Deep South. Such standpoints were ascertained through interviews. 
First, assessing local Malay-Muslims, the majority have been distrustful of security officials. The 
Muslim Attorney Center (MAC) in Pattani works to represent the rights of Deep South Malay-
Muslims. In an interview, its leader declared the following:  
Thai Malay-Muslims in the Deep South have traditionally been the victims of human rights 
violations by Thai state policies and the soldiers that implement them. It is the purpose of 
MAC to render legal assistance to Muslims detained by state authorities. Though MAC 
cooperates with Thai security officials, the Thai junta needs to implement SSR policies that 
prove to local Malay-Muslims that they can trust the military to be sincere, non-prejudicial, 
committed to justice and less repressive (Kohar interview, March 24, 2016).  
A second group, Deep South Buddhists, has been divided with regard to how to react to the 
insurgency. Some, mostly older-generation locals have supported a hardline state response while 
other, mostly younger-generation Buddhists have advocated a more moderate policy. According to 
Deep South Watch, moderates are gaining influence among Buddhists in the region (Deep South 
Watch 2015; Jitpiromsri interview 2015). 
Buddhist hardliners were disappointed at the Thai military’s move toward moderation in the Deep 
South. These individuals stated that  
Muslims always take; they never give; they are greedy; and the days of the dictatorship of 
Sarit Thanarat from 1958 to 1963 were good for Pattani province because the military used 
force to keep control […] Since Muslims can rarely be trusted, there should be more 
military supervision of Muslim teachers in the Deep South (Buddhist hardliners interview, 
October 9, 2015). 
The more moderate Deep South Buddhists seek a voice within the regional peace process. One of 
their representatives is Rukchart Suwan, leader of the Network of Buddhists for Peace (NBP) from 
Yala province. Rukchart declared in an interview that  
Deep South Buddhists do not like it that the state only makes discussions with Muslims. 
The NBP thus seeks to give moderate Buddhists in the region a voice, informing them of 
their rights and the peace process. At the same time hard-line Buddhists as well as some 
security officials are only making it more difficult to achieve peace in the Deep South by 
acting with prejudice against Muslims and referring to them as bandits (Kummetha 2016; 
Suwan interview, March 26, 2016). 
A third Deep South group, NGOs, have similarly been divided about their perceptions of security 
policy in the region. NGOs critical of security forces have recently accused the military of 
discrimination and profiling in the May 2015 implementation of a policy requiring southern 
Malay-Muslims to provide DNA samples via cotton swabs, fingerprints and other evidence. At a 
19 
   
PRIF Working Paper No. 52 
military-NGO meeting regarding the policy, the Thai commander of the region promised that “our 
officials are trying to adhere to human rights principles, as well as religious guidelines, when they 
search for targets” (Nasueroh 2015).  
This study interviewed leaders of three NGOs. The first two (interviewed together) voiced critical 
standpoints regarding military policy. As stated by their representatives, “the mistake of the 
military is that the problem in the Deep South is not a security problem. Rather, it is a problem of 
injustice in using natural resources, preventing participation in politics by locals, as well as 
censorship of identity” (Wetland Research Project interview 2013; Southern Islamic Culture 
Foundation interview 2013). The third NGO, “One Voice” Women’s Group, founded in 2015, is a 
merger of different Muslim women’s groups working to strengthen the role of women in building 
peace in the Deep South. The “One Voice” representative we interviewed responded as follows: 
Since the 2014 coup, the military has really tried to understand the Deep South problem. 
The regional commander even invited us to talk with him so that he could understand our 
problems. The military helps people because it enforces security in the Deep South. It is 
very good that the military has explicitly stated that ‘women will bring peace to the Deep 
South.’ The military pays much more attention to “One Voice” activities than ever before 
(“One Voice” 2015). 
A fourth group interviewed was a group of four local journalists. One of them told us the following 
(while the other three nodded in approval): 
The traditional mentality of the Thai security state in the Deep South was to implement 
repression. But now, with insurgency continuing and even becoming more violent, the 
post-2014 coup military is coming to realize that it must move from a military strategy to a 
political strategy of granting real autonomy (Journalists interview 2015). 
These journalists thus reflect a viewpoint that compromise is necessary to resolve the crisis in the 
Deep South, a view that they say the military has also come to adopt.  
The fifth group interviewed was local academics. Some members of this group have been more 
supportive of Thai military policy than others. One such academic stated the following: “Yes, the 
army is sincere about negotiations – they are not just a public relations ploy.” A second academic 
(sitting next to the first interviewee at the time) added that, “As a result, most people are beginning 
to feel more secure. Generally, security sector reforms – especially the junta’s commitment to 
negotiations – have been positive for the Deep South (Chomaitong/Laipaporn interview 2016). 
Other academics have been more critical. One such academic told us that “the crisis in the Deep 
South derives mainly from continuing Thai military repression of Malay-Muslim people in the 
region. While negotiations are useful, they must be incremental and involve input by local people. 
Ultimately, the state needs to create an autonomous zone for the Deep South” (Tamthai interview 
2013). Another academic declared that “the state should make efforts to promote greater peace 
education for locals in the Deep South to create ‘peace constituencies’ and it should also create a 
special cabinet ministry responsible for the Deep South” (Utarasint interview 2013). 
The sixth group interviewed consisted of two locally elected Muslim politicians in the Deep South 
at the level of subdistrict administrative organization. The first interviewee (interviewed before the 
2014 coup) stated that “Thai military policy has always unfairly targeted and discriminated against 
Malay-Muslims in the Deep South. Moreover, the Thai state does not trust Malay-Muslims.” 
When asked if any Thai government had ever won over any confidence from Malay-Muslims in 
Thailand’s Deep South, the second interviewee, responded by saying: 
Unlike the repressive military, the elected government of Yingluck Shinawatra was more 
compromising, she sincerely sought to connect with Thai Malay-Muslims, and also tried to 
give them a greater voice in Deep South affairs (politicians [anonymous] interview 2013). 
In sum, domestic non-state actors in the Deep South have held alternative viewpoints on Thai 
security policy in the region. These standpoints can be broken down into more supportive groups 
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urging a few security reforms versus far more critical groups looking for reforms that are much 
more substantial. Most of these domestic actors (e.g., NGOs, academics, Buddhists) are themselves 
divided in terms of their views on military policy in the Deep South. One particularly interesting 
trend is the growing number of moderates among Buddhists in the Deep South who favor a 
peaceful solution. Except for hard-line Buddhists and Muslims, virtually all Deep South actors 
support the on-going negotiations between the Thai state and MARA Patani. The most prominent 
critics of SSR in the Deep South have urged even greater security sector reforms such as the 
military’s adoption of more just and less repressive (deformative) policies toward Deep South 
Malay-Muslims, as well as greater prioritization of a negotiated settlement.  
5 CONCLUSION: IN NEED OF REAL REFORM 
Since 2014 in Thailand, a military junta and subsequent military-dominated electoral authoritarian 
regime have taken control of local ownership over SSR concepts and practices originated by 
Western democratization efforts about what is “good” security governance. Yet the junta has 
translated these ideas into policies primarily designed to bolster its prospects of staying in power 
for a long time. 
Thailand today is a country in which security policy is distinguished by level of analysis: national 
center and Deep South regional (periphery) level. At the center, Thailand’s military junta took 
control of Western-originated SSR notions to rationalize its seizure and perpetuation of power as 
well as the enlargement of its military capabilities to serve its own corporate interests and those of 
Thai aristocrats supporting the junta. Under the guise of SSR objectives, the “real” interests of the 
military are to consolidate political power, maintain legitimacy by demonstrating their guardian 
role of the king and Thai people, and ensure itself generous funding.  
In 2021 Thailand, in the aftermath of post-2014-2019 coup policies, this kind of security sector 
“deform” has reversed the country’s previous SSR attempts, given that the military has entrenched 
itself across the country. Because of the junta’s tinkering with the 2017 constitution, Prayuth’s 
government could last until 2023 or beyond. When the armed forces eventually allow a return to 
truly elected civilian rule, democracy will be weak and allow for a military with an enhanced 
deformation of enshrined powers.  
Meanwhile, at the periphery level of the Deep South (where the Malay-Muslim insurgency 
continues), Thailand’s arch-royalist military-dominated state actually applied Western-derived 
SSR notions to deliver security in the region less obtrusively and become a more conciliatory 
regional actor. This was motivated by an institutional interest in ending the region’s Malay-
Muslim insurgency, pressures from powerful international and domestic actors to lower tensions 
in the region, and a belief that it could borrow from the successful counterinsurgency experiences 
of other countries. Senior security officials want to end the conflict in order to enhance security 
and establish opportunities for development in the Deep South, put an end to the heavy 
investment in regional counterinsurgency which has depleted the Thai economy and comply with 
the King’s desire to quickly end the crisis. These interests pressure the junta to move toward SSR, 
firstly, because the junta recognizes that the past use of repression alone has been 
counterproductive, and secondly, because the King can influence military policy. 
In 2021, negotiations between the Thai army and representatives of insurgent groups (begun in 
2015) arbitrated by Malaysia entered their seventh year. Though insurgent attacks followed by state 
repression have continued, the peace talks could represent an unexpected diminishing of hostilities 
between the two sides. Meanwhile, there have been more meetings taking place between Buddhist 
civil society groups and Malay-Muslim civil society groups, which have been backed by the junta. 
External actors such as Malaysia, the OIC and Berghof Foundation have been supportive of these 
efforts. The junta policy in the Deep South appears to be one which, drawing from the SSR concept 
(except for civilian control), formally supports negotiations with insurgents, societal reconciliation 
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between Malay-Muslims and Thai Buddhists, as well as more moderation. At the same time, 
alongside these negotiations, the Thai state is using SSR as a legitimation to call for more budget, 
soldiers and weapons in its informal prosecution of a repressive counterinsurgency campaign. The 
state’s Deep South policy is rather hypocritical. Normatively shaped by professed adherence to 
globalized values, in practice it also continues to apply force indiscriminately as a policy 
instrument.  
There are numerous obstacles to the Thai state’s SSR efforts. First, insurgent attacks and military 
raids have persisted. Secondly, not all rebel groups have joined MARA, with some radicals refusing to 
be a part of any negotiations. Thirdly, some elements in the military do not support SSR to end the 
conflict (preferring repressive deformation) because the conflict has guaranteed them a steady source 
of financial support, such as higher military salary and illicit profits (e.g., oil smuggling). Some senior 
officers have shown themselves to be opposed to moderation in the Deep South. For example, junta 
leader Prayuth has in the past poured cold water over proposals for autonomy. Indeed, in 2011, 
responding to proposals for granting limited autonomy there, he declared: “Any action that may 
serve to undermine our strength or weaken state authority should be of concern […]. What is 
important is that Thais are Thais” (Szep 2011). Such comments have given rise to fears among 
Malay-Muslims in the Deep South that military talk of dialogue is simply not serious. Fourthly, the 
instability of Thai politics over the last decade could easily deter progress in negotiations.  
Meanwhile, other security sector problems are in need of reform. First, security officials are often 
insufficiently trained to deal with Deep South counterinsurgency issues. The result has been a 
knee-jerk preference for using repression rather than moderation. A second problem has been the 
misbehavior toward the local Malay-Muslim population by some security officials in the Deep 
South. Allegations of human rights violations, intimidation, discrimination and corruption have 
long tainted Thai bureaucrats. A third problem is that rotations of senior state officials in charge of 
the Deep South tend to happen so regularly that there appears to be a lack of policy durability. 
From 2014 until 2021, Thailand has had six army commanders and seven 4th Army commanders 
(and their teams), a trend in constant rotations which has hampered policy consistency. A fourth 
problem is the persistent clash between the army and police with regard to Deep South policy. The 
United States Embassy in Bangkok has referred to this rivalry as “institutionalized” (United States 
2006). The army has traditionally been dominant over the region while the police exercised 
enormous clout there from 2001 to 2006. Fifthly, elected civilian control needs to return to Deep 
South policy so that it becomes accountable. 
Ultimately, at the level of the Deep South, if Thai security forces sincerely seek reconciliation and 
peace, they need to take stock of the problems which this study has highlighted in terms of reforming 
the Thai security sector to better ensure the safety of the people. To achieve substantial change, 
reforms should be implemented based upon a genuine willingness to compromise rather than merely 
using masked deformation dialogue as a public relations ploy in combination with repression.  
Despite the attempts by Thai authoritarian actors to control the country at the national level and 
dominate the Deep South, such efforts have met resistance from the very parliament which the 
junta allowed to be elected in 2019. The Future Forward Party (Pak Anakot Mai), the second 
largest opposition party, was adamant about diminishing the size of the defense budget and 
passing other military reforms. But in February 2020, the junta-appointed Constitutional Court 
dissolved Future Forward, leaving only its smaller successor Move Forward Party (Pak Kao Klai) to 
try to push forward its goals. Interestingly, during that same month of February, a berserk soldier 
went on a shooting spree, killing dozens of civilians before he himself was shot (Bangkok Post, 
February 9, 2020). The tragedy resulted in promises by the military to finally implement tangible 
SSR. Despite promises, few, if any reforms have occurred (Khaosod, October 1, 2020). Regarding 
the Deep South, the 2019 election saw another small party send representatives to the Lower 
House. The party, People’s Nation (Prachachart), was part of the parliamentary opposition and 
brought up demands for reform of Thai Deep South policy during parliamentary sessions. 
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July–August, 2020 saw the beginning student-led demonstrations – occurring on a regular basis in 
urban areas. These have suddenly placed Thailand’s military and authoritarian electoral regime on 
the defensive. Among their demands, the protestors have called for Prime Minister Prayuth Cha-
ocha’s resignation, amendments to the 2017 constitution and monarchical reforms (Nikkei, 
October 15, 2020). Though it remains to be seen how and to what extent such protests will compel 
moves toward any SSR, it must be remembered that in Thailand’s history, all actual moves toward 
such reform only occurred following 1946, 1973 and 1992, years in which the military had become 
weak as a result of gaining a tainted and tarnished image (e.g., negatively seen by the public as 
bloody agents of dictatorship) and was thus faced with enormous opposition from society. It is 
thus likely that any real SSR in Thailand at the national level and Deep South will only occur when 
the military feels forced to engage in reform – following extensive pressure from demonstrators. 
For that to happen now would represent a breakthrough in Thai SSR efforts. But in 2021, with 
arch-royalist elites and their armed forces agents still quite powerful, the chances that these 
conservative groups will resist such change through the use of force is dangerously high.  
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